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Abstract
In his new book, Logical Form, Andrea Iacona distinguishes between 
two different roles that have been ascribed to the notion of logical 
form: the logical role and the semantic role. These two roles entail a 
bifurcation of the notion of logical form. Both notions of logical form, 
according to Iacona, are descriptive, having to do with different fea-
tures of natural language sentences. I agree that the notion of logical 
form bifurcates, but not that the logical role is merely descriptive. In 
this paper, I focus on formalization, a process by which logical form, on 
its logical role, is attributed to natural language sentences. According 
to some, formalization is a form of explication, and it involves norma-
tive, pragmatic, as well as creative aspects. I present a view by which 
formalization involves explicit commitments on behalf of a reasoner or 
an interpreter, which serve the normative grounds for the evaluation 
of a given text. In previous work, I proposed the framework of semantic 
constraints for the explication of logical consequence. Here, I extend the 
framework to include formalization constraints. The various constraints 
then serve the role of commitments. I discuss specific issues raised by 
Iacona concerning univocality, co-reference and equivocation, and I 
show how our views on these matters diverge as a result of our differ-
ent starting assumptions.
Keywords
Formalization, logical consequence, logical form, normativity of logic, 
semantic constraints.
It is a common contention that natural language sentences or utter-
ances have a logical form. In his recent book, Logical Form, Andrea 
Iacona formulates the following Uniqueness Thesis:
(UT) There is a unique notion of logical form that fulfils both the logi-
cal role and the semantic role. (Iacona 2018: 39)
Gil Sagi278
Iacona’s own main thesis in the book is that (UT) cannot stand. 
The two different roles, to be discussed shortly, are in conflict and 
entail a bifurcation of the notion of logical form. While the semantic 
role of logical form requires an intrinsicalist notion of logical form 
(that logical form is determined by intrinsic properties of a sentence, 
e.g., its syntactic structure), the logical role runs counter to intrinsi-
calism. And while in a logically ideal language logical properties can 
be perceived “in the symbol alone” (Wittgenstein 1922, §6.113, in a 
sense to be qualified in what follows), natural language is riddled with 
vagueness, ambiguity and context sensitivity. Context, and more gen-
erally, factors external to a sentence, determine its logical properties.
I agree with Iacona that the notion of logical form plays differ-
ent roles serving different purposes. However, while Iacona takes 
the project of assigning logical form to natural language sentences to 
be descriptive on either notion of logical form, I adopt a normative 
stance on the logical role. Contemporary logic studies logical proper-
ties through formal languages, and natural language sentences need 
to be formalized so that logical properties can be attributed to them 
systematically. This process includes a specification of a formal sys-
tem, and an assignment of formulae to natural language sentences. 
That much is in agreement with Iacona. By contrast to Iacona, I sug-
gest that both parts of the process have distinguished normative as-
pects. And so, the study of Iacona’s new book serves the occasion to 
present an alternative approach and compare the implications of both.
In this paper, I thus focus on the logical role of logical form. I 
view formalization as involving various sets of commitments. One 
set of commitments concerns the rules of the formal system into 
which natural language sentences are formalized. Those rules may 
be those of standard predicate logic—but I propose a more general 
outlook, based on a model-theoretic framework I have proposed in 
(Sagi 2014), by which the choice of formal system is made by impos-
ing semantic constraints on interpretations of expressions in the lan-
guage. The assignment of formulae to natural language sentences, 
in turn, involves a set of formalization constraints. Both types of con-
straints express commitments on behalf of the theorizer.
The paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I discuss the logical and 
the semantic roles that Iacona ascribes to logical form. I tie these 
roles to two different projects logicians have engaged in in the 20th 
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century: the linguistic project, which studies natural language using 
formal tools, and the traditional project, which contributes to the 
methodology of science by providing formal tools for reasoning. The 
logical role of logical form is then connected to the traditional proj-
ect, which in turn, has distinctive pragmatic and normative aspects. 
These aspects come to light when considering the notion of adequate 
formalization, which Iacona himself relates to logical form under-
stood through its logical role. I discuss the motivation for formaliza-
tion and its nature in §2, by considering the end result of formaliza-
tion and the process itself. It will emerge that formalization involves 
spelling out explicitly rules by which arguments can be evaluated, 
which I analyse as explicit commitments made by a reasoner. In §3, 
I make formal sense of these commitments. In §3.1, I utilize the 
model-theoretic framework of semantic constraints where a logical sys-
tem is obtained by imposing constraints on models vis-à-vis the in-
terpretation of terms in a given language. These constraints express 
the explicit commitments made by the reasoner. In addition, in §3.2, 
I define formalization constraints which express further commitments 
on the way natural language arguments are given a formal rendering 
which will be subject to semantic constraints. In §3.3, I discuss spe-
cific issues raised by Iacona concerning univocality, co-reference and 
equivocation, and I show how our views on these matters diverge as 
a result of our different starting assumptions. I conclude in §4.
1 The logical and the semantic roles of logical form
I take natural language to be a natural phenomenon to be studied em-
pirically by the various sub-disciplines in linguistics. I shall speak of 
natural language sentences, but this is already at some level of abstrac-
tion from actual data. Linguistic occurrences, such as utterances, 
are concrete and are set in context. However, at different levels of 
abstraction, we can speak of different kinds of structures underlying 
utterances: phonetic, morphological, syntactic, semantic, etc. Logi-
cal form is presumably revealed at a high level of abstraction, and 
there the tools developed by logicians in the turn of the 20th century 
and onwards have found linguistic use. Formulas are used to repre-
sent logical forms of sentences in natural language. But what kind of 
properties are uncovered at this level of structure?
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Iacona contends that there are two distinct notions of logical 
form, serving different purposes. Logical form has been ascribed a 
logical role, as it is used in explaining logical properties and relations 
such as validity and contradiction. In addition, logical form has been 
ascribed a semantic role, as it is used in the formulation of a compo-
sitional theory of meaning (p. 37).1 There may be other roles that 
have been ascribed to logical form, but Iacona focuses on the two 
aforementioned to show that the same notion cannot fulfill all roles 
ascribed to it.
The semantic role, which Iacona associated with Frege and the 
tradition of formal semantics leaning on his work, is used to ex-
plain how the meaning of a sentence depends on the meanings of 
its parts. Iacona ties the semantic role to intrinsic properties of sen-
tences, those which do not depend on external, contextual features. 
This is reasonable if we assume that compositional semantics is part 
of a theory of linguistic competence (Iacona speaks of the “conven-
tions that are constitutive of a language” (pp. 66f) rather than lin-
guistic competence—this difference will not matter much to what 
follows). Logical form, understood through its semantic role, is thus 
part of the subject matter of empirical linguistic study. Some ways of 
making sense of the intrinsicalist notion of logical form fulfilling the 
semantic role, according to Iacona, is through the notions of syntactic 
structure (as in Montague’s work), LF (as in the Chomskian tradition), 
and semantic structure (as in the Davidsonian approach). 
On the other hand, when it comes to the logical properties of sen-
tences, an intrinsicalist approach does not suffice. Logical properties 
of sentences may vary with context, as Iacona illustrates by examples 
(p. 48) on which the following is based:
 This is red and this is round
(*) 
 There is something that is both red and round
If this argument is uttered so that the two occurrences of “this” co-re-
fer, then, at least prima facie, it is valid—otherwise it is not. So, the va-
lidity of the argument cannot be determined by its intrinsic properties.
1 In what follows, all references by page number only are to Iacona 2018.
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Indeed, in some cases logical properties are not transparent to 
the reasoner, who is assumed to be linguistically competent. Those 
are cases where the reasoner, although linguistically competent, may 
still mistakenly believe that two occurrences of an expression refer 
to the same object (as “this” above, or a proper name used equivo-
cally unwittingly (p. 72)). And so, if logical form on its logical role is 
to account for logical properties, it cannot be a matter of linguistic 
competence.
According to Iacona, the logical properties of a sentence are at-
tributed to it vis-à-vis its content, which in turn is identified as what is 
said by the sentence and determines truth conditions. Logical prop-
erties, on Iacona’s understanding of content, are determined by the 
truth conditions of the sentence (p. 53). The precise understand-
ing of truth conditions and content are immaterial for Iacona’s aim 
(though some clarifications are made, the details of which I shall not 
repeat). What is important is that, according to Iacona, the truth 
conditions of a sentence determine its logical form as it fulfils the 
logical role of explaining logical properties, and truth conditions 
require appeal to extrinsic properties of sentences. Now, since the 
semantic role requires an intrinsic notion of logical form, and the 
logical role requires an extrinsic notion, one and the same notion of 
logical form cannot fulfil both roles. I agree with Iacona’s bifurca-
tion of the notion of logical form for two purposes, but I offer an 
alternative take on the logical role of logical form, that has implica-
tions on what logical properties may be assigned to natural language 
sentences.
Both notions of logical form, according to Iacona, are essentially 
descriptive (p. 43). One describes semantic structure, and the other 
content. In what follows, I propose a different stance, which empha-
sizes logic’s normative role. I reserve a descriptive notion of logical 
form for the scientific study of language. But I would also like to con-
sider a notion of logical form that is not merely descriptive, which 
accounts for the use of logic by reasoners and interpreters. While 
the tools developed by logicians have found a fruitful application in 
linguistic study, the original aim of some of these logicians was very 
different. It would be useful to consider, for present concerns, dif-
ferent purposes for which logic has been used that are relevant to 
Iacona’s distinction.
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Looking at work that has been done in the past century or so, we 
may distinguish between the linguistic project and the traditional proj-
ect, both of which use logical tools. The linguistic project has natural 
language as its subject matter of investigation, and it employs formal 
tools of logic in its study. It has been advanced by 20th century au-
thors such as Davidson, Harman, and Montague, as well as, argu-
ably, Chomsky. Relevant to us here is that the linguistic project is 
properly descriptive. The traditional project, on the other hand, is 
methodological: it seeks to provide a tool for reasoning in science. 
We may consider Frege’s Begriffsschrift as the paradigm of a contri-
bution to the traditional project: “Its first purpose, therefore, is to 
provide us with the most reliable test of the validity of a chain of 
inferences and to point out every presupposition that tries to sneak 
in unnoticed” (Frege 1967: 6). The view of logic as subsumed under 
the methodology of science has been advanced by 20th century au-
thors such as Carnap, Tarski and Quine.
Historically, the aims of the two projects have often been inter-
twined: a better understanding of natural language can lead to a 
more successful use of it in reasoning. Certainly, one can contribute 
to both projects at once without conflict. But since the advent of for-
mal languages, the two projects take on different routes. The avail-
ability of an alternative to natural language has brought revisionary 
tendencies to the traditional project, and in some cases to a complete 
break from natural language as a means for expression (as in Frege’s 
Begriffsschrift)—and so also to a break from the linguistic project.
In both the traditional and the linguistic projects logical formal-
isms are used as a tool. But there is an important difference. In the 
linguistic project, a formal language may be used to describe or mod-
el linguistic phenomena. In the traditional project, logical formal-
isms are used as means for reasoning by a researcher whose subject of 
investigation may be that of any of the sciences. The linguistic role is 
descriptive, and the traditional role has distinctive normative aspects.
Despite the engrained normative aspects logic has on its tradition-
al conception, some have denied that logic has a special claim for nor-
mativity. This has led to various defenses of the normativity of logic 
in the literature. A recent example is Steinberger (2019), who pro-
poses three ways in which logic can be claimed to be normative. Log-
ical norms provide first-personal directives that guide the reasoner; 
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logical norms serve to make third-personal evaluations, and they play 
the role of third-personal appraisals (see Steinberger 2019: 7). These 
logical norms are paramount in the traditional project. I would like 
to suggest that the use of formal languages in the traditional proj-
ect establishes a ground for these norms and provides a standard by 
which the fulfilment of these norms is measured. The articulation of 
a specified formal system to be used by a reasoner can be viewed as 
an explicit commitment to the rules of the system. Indeed, the rules 
provide directives guiding the reasoner, who commits him or herself 
to the evaluations and appraisals in light of the specified rules. We 
shall elaborate on this idea in the following sections.
Now, logical form serves different roles in either project. In the 
linguistic project, logical form is a theoretical concept that is used to 
explain linguistic phenomena. Indeed, this is precisely the semantic 
role discussed by Iacona. What role does logical form have in the 
traditional project?
Recall that our concern here is with the logical form of sentences 
in natural language, which the traditional project aims to revise and 
ideally replace by formal alternatives. But natural language may still 
be present and relevant to the traditional project. Despite the ad-
vance in formal tools, reasoners in various disciplines and contexts 
have not yet given up natural language. The practice of formaliza-
tion serves to fill the gap between reasoning in natural language and 
the formal tools provided by logicians. In the process of formaliza-
tion, formulae of a formal language are assigned to natural language 
sentences, so that their logical properties can be evaluated. This is 
where logical form plays a role in the traditional project: a formula 
assigned to a natural language sentence by a process of formalization 
represents the sentence’s logical form. Arguably, logical form here 
plays the logical role alluded to by Iacona. However, by contrast to 
Iacona’s position, logical form here is not a merely descriptive notion, 
but it is rather bound with the methodological and normative fea-
tures of the traditional project. We shall discuss formalization in the 
next section. One of our main contentions will be that logical form is 
not discovered and described as in the work of linguists, but rather, it 
is assigned and committed to by agents as reasoners and interpreters.
Sure enough, Iacona has a different idea of the logical role of logi-
cal form in mind. Iacona speaks of logical form in its logical role as 
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pertaining to objective notions of content and of truth conditions, 
that are there to be discovered and described. It may seem that while 
logical form in the linguistic project does match the semantic role 
Iacona ascribes to logical form, the normative notion of logical form 
that I associate with the traditional project is not the one Iacona aims 
at when he discusses the logical role—and therefore we may have 
three notions of logical form at hand (an option that Iacona seems to 
be open to (p. 38)). Be that as it may, it is worth noting that Iacona 
ties the logical role (and not the semantic role) of logical form to for-
malization. According to Iacona, “The truth-conditional view stems 
from the idea that an adequate formalization of a set of sentences 
provides a representation of their content” (p. 58). A formalization of 
a sentence, according to Iacona, mirrors its truth conditions relative 
to an interpretation, where an interpretation of a sentence fixes its 
content in accordance with its meaning (p. 59).
It is clear that while there may be principles guiding adequate 
formalization, the end result is highly underdetermined. Moreover, 
while the adequate criteria of formalization and the nature of formal-
ization itself have been in dispute, there seems to be wide agreement 
among writers that formalization is not a merely descriptive matter. 
According to some, formalization is a form of explication, and it in-
volves normative, pragmatic, as well as creative aspects. If Iacona’s 
discussion of formalization is aimed at the same practice referred to 
by these writers, then there is room to doubt that the notion of logi-
cal form which he aims at, which fulfils the logical role, is merely 
descriptive. In the next section, I present an approach to formaliza-
tion that will provide an alternative, normative outlook to the logical 
role of logical form.
2 Formalization as a humanistic endeavor
By “formalization” one can refer to a process or to an end result. The 
end result consists of sentences or arguments in a formal language, 
perhaps with some kind of dictionary. The process takes sentences or 
arguments in natural language and produces a formal rendering. In 
fact, as explained by Brun (2014), formalization is a stage in a wider 
process of argument reconstruction, where a text in a natural language 
is analysed and is evaluated with respect to the validity of the in-
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formal arguments it contains. This process includes a stage of argu-
ment analysis, producing informal inferences where the premisses 
and conclusions are spelled out, followed by formalization, which 
produces formal arguments which can be assessed by the rules of a 
formal system.
Let us first consider the end result of formalization. We have men-
tioned that Frege’s Begriffsschrift is aimed at providing a “most reliable 
test of validity” (Frege 1967: 6). Natural language, while useful for 
everyday purposes, is ill-suited for this task. Ambiguity, vagueness 
and context-sensitivity are just a few of the phenomena that obstruct 
the use of natural language for scientific purposes. A language that 
is suitable for scientific purposes, where validity is paramount, will 
minimize fallacies that originate in language use. Such a language 
will be maximally logically perspicuous. Wittgenstein expressed this 
Fregean objective as a feature of the Tractarian ideal language, where 
“It is the characteristic mark of logical propositions that one can per-
ceive in the symbol alone that they are true; and this fact contains in 
itself the whole philosophy of logic.” (Wittgenstein 1922, §6.113). 
Logical propositions correspond to nothing in reality, so their truth 
depends merely on the symbols. More generally, the ideal, using Ia-
cona’s terminology, is that logical properties would depend only on 
intrinsic properties of sentences.
Carnap has added a qualification to Wittgenstein’s remark. Sym-
bols on their own do not have logical properties: those are acquired 
only in a linguistic framework. Carnap remarked that “It is certainly 
possible to recognize from its form alone that a sentence is analytic; 
but only if the syntactical rules of the language are given.” (Carnap 
1937: 186). Carnap’s addition that the rules must be given comes 
from his position that there is a conventional aspect to logic. At this 
stage in his work, Carnap speaks of syntactic rules (which include 
rules of inference and of well-formedness), but the point general-
izes to semantic or other frameworks as well. Logic is relative to a 
linguistic framework, so only given a framework can analyticity (or 
logicality) be determined.
Whether or not logic is conventional in the way Carnap thought 
it was, symbols certainly have no logical properties on their own—it 
is only in virtue of their meaning or the rules governing them that a 
logical property can be attributed to them. And so, when formalizing 
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into an artificial language, one must specify its rules. And setting the 
rules, or choosing a formal system into which to formalize, is not a 
trivial matter.
So even in an ideal language, logical properties cannot be rec-
ognized from the symbols alone (if the ideal should be conceivably 
attainable). Rules pertaining to the symbols are involved as well. 
Presumably, there are rules governing the use of natural language 
expressions too. If our interest is in evaluating arguments in natural 
language, we can undertake the task of exposing these rules through 
linguistic analysis, and use them to make an assessment—what is 
then the gain in the use of a formal language?
First, the most obvious gain is that of decontextualization. Natu-
ral language sentences are stated in context, and as argued by Iacona, 
their logical properties require an extrinsic notion of logical form. 
And so, even the symbols together with the rules do not suffice to 
determine logical properties: context is another non-trivial factor. 
Context resolves structural and lexical ambiguity, as well as the co-
reference or lack thereof of demonstratives, as in example (*). The 
outcome of formalization is phrased in a context-insensitive formal 
language. This still leaves us apart from the Tractarian ideal, but it 
brings us to the Carnapian more realistic goal: the logical properties 
in a decontextualized language depend on the symbols and the rules 
alone.2
Secondly, and relatedly, formalization gives another important 
benefit. While both natural and formal language are governed by 
rules, only in a formal language the surface structure reflects the 
logical form of the sentence, and so by formalizing the logical prop-
erties are made perspicuous. In natural language, one is more likely 
to be misled by the surface structure. Formal languages, by virtue 
of their perspicuity, provide means for “calculating” logical proper-
ties from the surface structure. Moreover, it has been proposed that 
2 Context-sensitivity, or at least some aspects thereof, have been incorpo-
rated into the logical treatment of natural language, as in Kaplan 1989. For recent 
treatments of logicality in a context-sensitive setting, see Woods 2017 and Woods 
and Michaelson, manuscript. These studies are of significance for understanding 
logical form in its semantic role, as they facilitate an account of logicality that is 
based on speakers’ competence. How these studies may relate to the traditional 
aim, which is at issue here, is a matter we shall not pursue.
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formal languages serve as “cognitive artefacts enhancing and modify-
ing an agent’s reasoning processes” (Dutilh Novaes 2012).
Nonetheless, I suggest that the significance of formalization goes 
well beyond decontextualization and the unification of surface struc-
ture and logical form. Recall that formalization here is conceived as 
a stage in argument reconstruction. This process is carried out by a 
reasoner or an interpreter, and it ultimately serves for the evaluation 
of logical properties of a given text. By moving to a formal language, 
the reasoner makes explicit their interpretive and logical commit-
ments: what they take to be the form of the arguments of the given 
text, and what logical rules they subscribe to in its evaluation.3 For-
malization thus provides the ground for logical norms to be applied.
In this connection, the transition to a formal language is not a 
merely mechanical procedure. The view of formalization that emerg-
es takes natural language sentences not merely as objects of formal 
study, but also as vehicles of reasoning to be interpreted and evalu-
ated. The analysed text is treated as the expression of an interlocu-
tor. The idea that a text can be thoroughly interpreted and evaluated 
using formal means makes formalization a humanistic endeavor par 
excellence. In the rest of this section we spell out some implications 
and further aspects of this approach.
It would be helpful to say a few words about the process of formal-
ization. It is generally agreed among authors that even though the 
process of formalization is far from trivial, there are basic criteria of 
adequacy. An adequate formalization should be in line with judge-
ments of informal validity (Baumgartner and Lampert 2008). Mak-
ing this idea precise, however, brings with it disagreement among 
authors. When formalizing, should one appeal to the most charitable 
interpretation of the text, and e.g. add hidden premisses to make 
stated arguments valid, or should one try to track the author’s inten-
tion whether felicitous or not, or neither? This issue is related to a 
more general concern: should the process of formalization involve 
3 The view presented here should be distinguished from that of Brandom 
1994. While making explicit here and in Brandom exposes inferential relations 
and allows them to be accessible to critical discussion, in the present context mak-
ing explicit means spelling out rules in the context of a formal system, whereas 
Brandom speaks of making inferential relations explicit using logical vocabulary 
within a language. For a critical discussion, see Brun 2018.
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some kind of reflective equilibrium (following Rawls (1999) and 
Goodman (1983)) between judgments of instances, general rules and 
perhaps a background theory? Resnik (1985), Peregrin and Svoboda 
(2013, 2017) and Brun (2014, 2017) are examples advocating reflec-
tive equilibrium, and Thagard (1982) and Baumgartner and Lampert 
(2008) are in opposition. Should criteria for adequate formalization 
be semantic (Sainsbury 1993; Baumgartner and Lampert 2008), or 
be based on inferential grounds (Peregrin and Svoboda 2013, 2017)? 
Should findings from empirical linguistics or psychology have sub-
stantial impact on logical practice? Thagard (1982) is for, and Resnik 
(1985) is against.
These are just a few of the points of contention, without aiming 
at a full literature survey. In what follows I shall not take a stand on 
specific criteria for adequate formalization. My aim is to characterize 
the process as a whole, and to provide a formal framework. At this 
point, we may observe that formalization is treated in the literature 
not as a merely descriptive endeavor, and that it involves normative 
and pragmatic concerns. If the purpose of the formalization is to 
evaluate the logical validity of arguments presented in some text 
(rather than a purely linguistic study of the text), the task includes 
interpretive and exegetical aspects. Indeed, authors have emphasized 
the creative aspects of formalization, some going so far as claiming 
that there is no hidden logical form that is exposed by formalization 
(Brun 2014; Peregrin and Svoboda 2017).
Carnap was one of the main advocates of the use of formal tools 
in philosophy and science. The method of Carnapian explication 
takes an informal concept (the explicandum), and replaces it with 
one that is more precise (the explicatum)—ideally with a formal one 
couched in a formal system. Explication has four main desiderata: 
similarity of the explicatum to the explicandum, exactness of the 
rules of use of the explicatum, fruitfulness, and simplicity (Carnap 
1962: 5–8). The explicatum will not have the same meaning as the 
explicandum, nor even the same extension, except in distinguished 
contexts. Explication is a pragmatic endeavor, and its aim is meth-
odological: to enable scientific progress by the introduction of more 
precise concepts.
Several authors have adopted an approach to formalization that is 
akin to Carnapian explication, specifically as in both we move from 
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the informal to the (more) formal and exact. For example, according 
to the view advanced by Baumgartner and Lampert, “Formalization, 
thus, is a means to explicate informal reasoning… formalizations are 
not and will never be the result of a formal, effective formalization 
procedure, because formalizing a natural language text T crucially 
rests on an informal understanding of T and not simply on its surface 
grammar” (Baumgartner and Lampert 2008: 25). I am in agreement 
with this approach, but further, I subscribe to the dominant prag-
matic aspects of Carnapian explication: a formalization does not aim 
at an accurate translation, nor does it reveal a hidden logical form. 
According to Brun, “In sum, formalizing is not merely abstracting 
but also involves creative and normative aspects of constructing logi-
cal forms and resolving matters of logical form, which are alien to 
paradigmatic forms of translation.” (Brun 2014: 102) When formal-
izing we do assign to sentences a logical form, but this assignment is 
not made on a merely descriptive basis.
Formalization, as it has been presented, involves making choices: 
choosing a formal system and its rules and choosing which formal 
expression to assign to which natural language expression. These 
choices are guided, at least in part, by the desiderata for Carnapian 
explication. But what I take to be of primary importance in this pro-
cess, is that the rules are stated explicitly, and they are thus com-
mitted to and thereby endowed with normative force. What marks 
the difference between formal language and natural language is pre-
cisely this: a formal language is constituted by explicitly stated rules. 
While natural language might be governed by rules, those are not 
given explicitly at the outset, and they need to be discovered by lin-
guistic study on the basis of recorded regularities. The outcome of 
linguistic study is subject to correction and revision, while the rules 
of a formal language cannot be erroneously attributed to the lan-
guage they themselves define.
The explicitly stated rules of a formal language are constitutive 
of it, and their status as such is the source of their normative force. 
When employing a formal language, one is subject to evaluation vis-
à-vis its rules. Indeed, when one uses a formal language, one thereby 
commits oneself to the norms of following its rules.4 It is important 
4 How these norms, that are derived from the rules, are spelled out exactly is 
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that the rules are explicit, because only then can one properly com-
mit to them and be evaluated according to them. Natural language 
is a complex, dynamic, natural phenomenon. When we formalize, 
we rigidify language (see also Peregrin and Svoboda 2017: 3). Once 
the rules are set explicitly and committed to, there is no recourse 
to previous use. Surely, the rules can be revised, but that again 
must be done explicitly and it entails a renouncement of previous 
commitments.
3 Formalization and semantic constraints
In this section, I would like to explore the ideas of the previous sec-
tions in a formal implementation. We shall look at a model-theoretic 
framework of semantic constraints which is a generalization of standard 
first order logic (Sagi 2013, 2014).
In standard, first- or higher-order logical systems, a distinction is 
made between the logical and the nonlogical vocabulary. The logi-
cal vocabulary gets a fixed meaning over models, and the nonlogical 
vocabulary gets any interpretation that accords with its semantic cat-
egory. Standardly, the logical vocabulary includes the propositional 
truth-functional connectives, the existential and universal quanti-
fiers, and perhaps the identity sign as well. However, the question of 
whether there is a principled distinction between logical and nonlog-
ical terms has occupied philosophers of logic in recent decades. Vari-
ous criteria have been proposed—invariance criteria (which shall be 
mentioned in §3.1) are perhaps the most widely accepted. Some, on 
the other hand, have been skeptical about there being a principled 
distinction between logical and nonlogical terms, and have offered 
relativistic or pragmatic outlooks.
In the previous section, I suggested that in the context of formal-
ization, the rules of a formal system express commitments on be-
half of the reasoner, interpreter or interlocutor. In standard systems, 
these rules will include the recursive syntactic and semantic clauses 
for expressions of the language. Specifically, one commits to a fixed 
interpretation of the logical vocabulary, and makes no commitment 
with respect to the nonlogical vocabulary, apart from the division 
not a trivial matter. For this issue, I refer the reader to Steinberger 2019.
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into semantic categories. The nonlogical expressions may have as-
sociated natural language counterparts, but after formalization the 
latter’s meaning is completely abstracted away. However, when it 
comes to the analysis of arguments, this mode of operation might 
be unduly stringent. There may be cases where it is best to fix the 
interpretation of a term to some extent without fixing it completely 
as a logical term. One may wish not to commit to the interpretation 
of a connective in all cases, e.g. leave it open whether a disjunction 
is inclusive or exclusive; or to commit to a pair of terms having the 
same interpretation without committing to what that interpretation 
is; or, not to commit to the semantic category of a term but only to 
that of expressions containing it.
In previous work, I have proposed a model-theoretic framework 
of semantic constraints which allows fixing the interpretation of terms 
in various ways and to different degrees. No division of the vocabu-
lary into semantic categories, nor its division into the logical and 
the nonlogical is assumed at the outset. The interpretations of terms 
are restricted through constraints on models used to interpret the 
language. This framework is a generalization of standard first order 
logic, as all the standard rules can be rephrased as semantic con-
straints. The framework can also be extended to higher-order or in-
tensional semantics. In the next subsection, I give the basic details of 
the extensional framework.
The end result of formalization, on the present approach, is a 
system of semantic constraints to which there is an explicit com-
mitment. However, formalization includes further commitments 
that have to do with the transition from natural language to a formal 
language. In §3.2 I shall thus add to the framework the notion of for-
malization constraints, which will express these further commitments.
3.1 Semantic constraints: the framework
This section presents the basics of the framework of semantic con-
straints. We start with some definitions, give some examples, and 
at the end discuss the considerations on the basis of which a set of 
semantic constraints may be chosen and committed to.
First, we need to say what a language consists of and how it is in-
terpreted. Both what is considered a language and what is considered 
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a model for the language are generalized and include very little as-
sumptions at the outset. The syntax we assume for a language is very 
minimal, and includes two basic categories. A language L consists 
of terms (the primitive expressions) and phrases (the complex expres-
sions). Phrases are strings of terms, perhaps with the addition of aux-
iliary symbols such as parentheses (every term is a phrase, but not 
every string is a phrase). No rules of well-formedness other than the 
specification of phrases are assumed at the outset.
A model for L is a pair M=⟨D, I⟩ such that D, the domain, is a 
nonempty set, and I is an interpretation function. Since we do not 
assume clauses for logical vocabulary at the outset, nor do we as-
sume compositionality of the language, the interpretation function 
is therefore unconstrained at the outset. An interpretation function is 
thus a function that takes phrases to elements in the set-theoretic 
hierarchy built over D∪{T, F} (the domain and the truth values).
The metalanguage includes, apart from names for the expressions 
in the object language, the language of set theory with optional ad-
ditional vocabulary depending on the semantic constraints to be for-
mulated. A semantic constraint is a statement in the metalanguage that 
includes an implicit quantification over models, domains and inter-
pretation functions, that somehow constrains or restricts the admis-
sible models for a given language. All standard semantic clauses for 
the interpretation of logical vocabulary can be rephrased as semantic 
constraints, which may or may not be included in a system, as well as 
a host of other kinds of constraints.5
So, for example, the following statement regarding the interpre-
tation of conjunction, is a semantic constraint suitable for proposi-
tional logic:6
I(f∧y)=T ⇔ I(f)=I(y)=T
5 Semantic constraints are akin to meaning postulates (expressed in the meta-
language) as in the work of Carnap and Montague. The essential difference is that 
in the work of these authors, meaning postulates come on top of a logical system 
constituted by recursive clauses for the logical terminology. Here, there is no 
fundamental difference between clauses for logical terms and other semantic con-
straints, and there is no underlying logical system assumed (see Sagi 2014: 267f).
6 Predicate logic requires an adjusted condition in terms of satisfaction (see 
Sagi 2013).
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A model admissible by this constraint is such that it interprets con-
junction in the standard way. Other semantic constraints may con-




rule out models where the intersection of allRed and allGreen or of 
even and odd are non- empty. More examples constraining set-theo-
retic relations may include:
I(bachelor) ⊆ I(unmarried)
I(wasBought) = I(wasSold)
The language is not assumed to have semantic categories at the out-
set. The following constraints serve the purpose of restricting the 
interpretation of a term to some standard semantic category:
I( John) ∈ D
restricts John to be always interpreted as a member of the domain,
I(big) ⊆ D
restricts big to be interpreted as a subset of the domain, and
I(abc) ∈ {T,F}
restricts the phrase abc (the string composed of the terms a, b and 
c) to be interpreted as a sentence: to always take a truth value as its 
interpretation.
One can also partially fix the interpretation of a term by demand-
ing that some object would be a member of it (in which case that ob-
ject is thus forced to be a member of every domain to be considered 
admissible), for example by:
0 ∈ I(naturalNumber)
Here the number 0 is forced to be a member of the interpretation of 
naturalNumber. This should be distinguished from a constraint that 




In all these examples, we have statements in the metalanguage re-
garding the interpretation of expressions in the object language 
which may be viewed as expressing commitments with respect to 
the object language. The semantic constraints above need not all be 
endorsed in a system for logic—various considerations are in place 
when choosing which constraints to finally commit to—we shall 
discuss some of them in what follows.
Given a set of semantic constraints D, a class of the D-admissible 
models is determined. While the initial class of models makes no 
distinctions between different terms and phrases, the more semantic 
constraints are included, the more distinctions can be made. Several 
semantic notions can be defined in the framework. Logical valid-
ity (w.r.t. D) is defined as truth preservation over the D-admissible 
models. For definitions of other notions (dependency, determinacy, 
compositionality etc., see Sagi 2014).
The main value of the framework of semantic constraints is in 
its generality and in that it makes only minimal assumptions made 
at the outset. No strict distinction between logical and nonlogical 
vocabulary needs to be assumed (though such a distinction can be 
accommodated). This generality is relevant to our present concern 
as well. Different features of logical systems in this framework are 
expressed as statements that may or may not be endorsed, and in the 
present context these are explicit commitments that may or may not 
be made with respect to the language.
The framework of semantic constraints can be used descriptively, 
e.g. in the study of certain features of natural languages. Here we 
are considering semantic constraints as providing the end result of 
formalization, and so, from the perspective of a reasoner, an inter-
preter or an interlocutor. A set of constraints is chosen, relative to 
which validity is defined and arguments are assessed. The chosen 
constraints can be the outcome of an explication of expressions in 
the source language from which arguments have been formalized, 
7 In the case of numerals, I use boldface to distinguish the numeral as a term 
in the object language.
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in line with the view of formalization presented in the previous sec-
tion. However, the guiding principle on which this choice is based, 
I suggest, is whether the reasoner (interpreter, interlocutor) would 
commit to the given semantic constraints. Are these constraints ap-
propriate to set the standard by which the formalized arguments 
should be evaluated?
Two sets of considerations are then in place. The first set of con-
siderations revolves the question, is the given constraint adequate 
with respect to the meanings we would like to capture? For exam-
ple, is the example constraint above regarding conjunction adequate 
with respect to the connective meaning we would like to capture? 
Is it adequate to demand that the extensions of allRed and allGreen 
be mutually exclusive, given the meanings that they are intended to 
capture? Here we may include all the considerations that take place 
when carrying out an explication. We may wish to remain close to 
usage of terms in the source language, and thus include empirical 
descriptive adequacy with respect to that language as a significant 
factor. Or, we may consider the simplicity and fruitfulness of the 
candidate semantic constraint as decisive factors.
The second set of secondary considerations revolves the question, 
is the given constraint adequate for being included in a system for 
logic? It might be that we have good reason to explicate naturalNum-
ber so that its extension will include 0, or allRed and allGreen so that 
their extensions are mutually exclusive. Yet, these reasons might not 
suffice for including the relevant semantic constraints in a system for 
logic—it might be that these features of these terms’ meanings is not 
something that we would like to include in a system deciding logical 
validity. If we have a criterion for the logicality of semantic con-
straints, it might deem some constraints as unacceptable regardless 
of their adequacy with respect to intended meaning. Let us elaborate 
some more on the consideration of logicality.
We have mentioned that the strict distinction between the logical 
and nonlogical vocabulary in standard systems raises the question 
of whether a criterion could be formulated on the basis of which 
the distinction could be made. While the framework of semantic 
constraints forgoes the strict distinction, the question of a criterion 
remains in a different form. In the more general framework, terms 
can be fixed in a variety of manners—but how should they be fixed? 
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Is there a criterion for the “correct”, or the “logical” semantic con-
straints? It would take us too far afield to deal properly with the 
issue of criteria for the logicality of semantic constraints.8 Relevant 
to us here, is that if such a criterion is accepted, its function in for-
malization as we approach it is that of a meta-commitment. While each 
semantic constraint accepted expresses a commitment with respect 
to the interpretation of the object language, a criterion for semantic 
constraints expresses a second level commitment that can be applied 
to any object language treated in the framework. Such a criterion 
thus concerns the framework itself and how it may be used, and can 
be used to express a commitment with respect to the semantic ap-
paratus itself employed in the formalization.
Finally, the system of semantic constraints that serves as the end 
result of formalization embodies a set of explicit commitments that 
follow from a range of considerations: some having to do with the 
semantic apparatus used, some with descriptive aspects of the source 
language, some with the potential fruitful use of the system on dif-
ferent occasions. Indeed, the end result can be seen as explicating, 
or as partially explicating the terms that are constrained. And once a 
system of constraints is formulated explicitly, it is normatively bind-
ing. While an argument given in natural language can be described 
and interpreted in different ways and its logicality is always under-
determined, this is not so when commitments with respect to the 
language are made explicit. Any argument formulated within a for-
mal system whose rules are stated explicitly is subject to evaluation, 
appraisal or blame, on the basis of the commitments made by the 
statement of the rules—and in the present proposal—the rules are 
rules of interpretation in the form of semantic constraints.
3.2 Formalization constraints
We should now deal with the process of formalization: with the 
transition from an argument in natural language to an argument in 
8 In work in progress, I propose a meta-constraint which serves as a necessary 
condition on the inclusion of a semantic constraint in a system for logic. The 
condition is a generalization of the criterion of invariance under isomorphisms 
for logical terms.
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a formal language. Recall that the process of formalization decon-
textualizes and gives to each natural language argument a formal 
rendering that is governed by explicitly stated rules. In the previous 
section, we have not specified a specific formal language with a set of 
rules—we have only presented a framework in which such a system 
can be defined through semantic constraints. Accordingly, in this 
section, we shall only delineate the notion of a formalization constraint. 
Specific formalization constraints are chosen ad hoc on a particular 
occasion of formalization. Formalization constraints express explic-
itly stated commitments on behalf of the formalizer with respect to 
the formal rendering of a given text.
Formalization is always carried out with respect to a particular 
text in context. We may thus conceive of a formalization function 
that takes sequences of source language expressions in context as 
arguments, and gives target language expressions as values. Such a 
sequence can be anything from a single expression in context to the 
sequence consisting of the whole text to be analysed.
A formalization function is ad hoc in that it is limited to a given 
text to be analysed on an occasion. To allow for various kinds of 
context shifts, we do not assume a constant context throughout the 
given text. Each source language expression is given in some con-
text, and we do not assume at the outset that any pair of contexts 
involved are equal, nor that they are distinct.
So for a formalization function F, we assume that the domain of 
F is {<<e1,c1>, ... ,< en,cn >> : for each 1≤i≤n, ei  is a source expres-
sion, ci is a context, and n∈N} and the range of F is the set of phrases 
of the target language. Ordinarily, there will be systematic relations 
between the values of sequences and those of the subsequences con-
sisting them (e.g. if the source language is assumed to be composi-
tional), but those are not forced at the outset.
In particular examples, instead of a pair of an expression and a 
context, we shall attach a subscript to an expression to designate the 
context in which it is expressed: thisi is the occurrence of the expres-
sion “this” in context i. It should be noted that expressions in context 
already pose some level of abstraction from the way in which natural 
language sentences are actually presented to us. Normally, an argu-
ment is presented through a concrete occurrence of speech or writ-
ing, from which expression-context pairs can be extracted through 
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abstraction. This process is important to note, because it involves the 
nontrivial decision of whether two concrete speech or text occur-
rences, while being distinct, share either or both parameters of lin-
guistic expression and context. For instance, this stage of abstraction 
decides whether two occurrences of a proper name each referring to 
a different individual, are considered as different linguistic items, or 
as the same expression used in different contexts.
The target language consists of terms and phrases governed by a 
set of semantic constraints. As for the source language, we assume 
that it consists of expressions, primitive and complex, in which we 
distinguish only a category of declarative sentences. We may have 
an elaborate theory of the source language, but we are not assuming 
that such exists at the outset. The formalization function assigns to 
each occurrence of a declarative sentence in the source language (con-
strued as a sequence of expressions in context) a sentence in the target 
language,9 so that the outcome of a formalization of a source language 
argument is a target language argument that can be assessed for valid-
ity. The formalization function may be partial, except when restricted 
to the occurrences of declarative sentences in the source text.
We are thus given a sequence of natural language expressions in 
context. We assume that some argument analysis has been done to 
discern the premisses and the conclusion. Beyond that, we assume as 
little as possible on the outcome of formalization at the outset—we 
use formalization constraints to narrow down possible outcomes.
An occurrence of a declarative sentence in the source language 
will normally span over different contexts, if it is composed of expres-
sions which in turn are expressed in different contexts. Recall exam-
ple (*) (p. 4), where two occurrences of “this” may be used to denote 
different objects in the very same sentence: this is possible only when 
interpreting each occurrence of “this” relative to a different context.
Now, it has been noted that any useful formalization cannot be a 
one-one function from expression-context pairs to target language 
expressions. In such a case, there will be no repetition in the text, and 
9 Recall that in the framework of semantic constraints, a division of phrases 
into grammatical categories is not assumed at the outset: sets of constraints im-
pose the relevant distinctions. So, for instance, we may define a sentence as fol-
lows: A phrase s is a sentence (with respect to a set of semantic constraints D) if 
I(s)=T or I(s)=F in every D-model.
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we lose all possibility of a pattern in an argument that can give rise 
to interesting logical properties. For example, assume the target lan-




would never be the outcome of formalization, because it would never 
be the case that the same propositional letter is used twice (Brun 
2008: 7).10
The role of formalization constraints is thus to expose patterns in 
the source text. This can be done by either forcing the formalization 
function to take multiple source expressions to some specific target 
expression:
(1) F(<Itc1isc2rainingc3>) = p
(2) F(<Itc4isc5rainingc6>) = p
or by forcing the formalization function to give the same value to 
two occurrences of a source expression, without forcing a specific 
value:
(3) F(<Itc1isc2rainingc3>) = F(<Itc4isc5rainingc6>)
By the latter constraint (3), we are making an explicit commitment 
to the effect that two utterances of “it is raining” will be formal-
ized into the same phrase and thus obtain the same value in every 
model for the target language. By the preceding pair of constraints, 
(1) and (2), we are making a commitment to a specific formaliza-
tion, a consequence of which is that they are formalized into target 
phrases which are given the same value by the interpretation func-
tion in every model.
Analogously, we may constrain the formalization function to take 
two source expressions to different phrases. This can be done by 
10 We may note that the framework of semantic constraints is general enough 
to accommodate systems where validities do not include any repetition (e.g. by 
employing semantic constraints that force different expressions to be assigned the 
same interpretation, see the discussion of co-reference in §3.3), but such systems 
would be extremely cumbersome and would exclude any of the standard logical 
validities.
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directly formalizing into distinct phrases:
(4) F(thisc7) = a
(5) F(thisc8) = b
or by just constraining the formalization function to assign to the 
two occurrences different phrases:
(6) F(thisc7) ≠ F(thisc8)
Note that the target expressions might still be given the same inter-
pretation in a model, if there is no semantic constraint forbidding it, 
such as
(7) I(a)≠I(b)
A fortiori, there may be a semantic constraint forcing the two phras-
es to be given the same value in every model:
(8) I(a)=I(b)
Finally, the formalization function will take some expression occur-
rences to designated phrases in the target language that have speci-
fied semantic constraints restricting their possible interpretations, as 




The examples of formalization and semantic constraints we have 
given so far (either (1) and (2), or just (3)) enable us to ascertain the 
validity of the following argument, if we include the semantic con-
straints I(p)∈{T,F} and I(q)∈{T,F}, and a constraint to the effect that 
the formalization of the premise is a concatenation of the formaliza-
tion of its parts:
Itc1isc2rainingc3andc9itc12isc13snowingc14
Itc4isc5rainingc6
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And the same constraints enable us to ascertain the invalidity of 
the following argument, on the condition that we do not include 
the semantic constraint I(a)=I(b) (or constraints that entail it), and 
that we include in addition the semantic and formalization con-




By the possible formalization:
allRed(a)
allRed(b)
Formalization constraints are chosen and committed to on the basis 
of the considerations mentioned in the previous section, and will 
depend on specific interpretive policies and aims. Now, formaliza-
tion constraints give us a range of formalization functions. The in-
tended outcome of the process of formalization is an argument in the 
target language provided by some specific formalization function. 
However, as is well accepted, in each case there may be different yet 
equally admissible formalizations leading to the same verdict regard-
ing validity. It is thus not a specific formalization that one commits 
to, but rather some constraints on formalization. A function abiding 
by those constraints can then be chosen arbitrarily.
It may be that a given set of formalization constraints allows for 
formalizations which do not agree on the validity of a given argu-
ment. In such a case, the reasoner should strive to settle the matter 
by adding further formalization constraints. 
Finally, we may consider some formalization meta-constraints: 
constraints on formalization constraints. In fact, we have already 
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formulated one: The formalization function should always take a de-
clarative sentence of the source language to a sentence of the target 
language. More meta-constraints can be formulated along the lines 
of criteria for adequate formalization discussed in the literature, that 
we have mentioned in §2. The following criterion is endorsed by 
Baumgartner and Lampert (2008): 
Correspondence: The formalization of an argument should be valid  
     iff the source argument is informally valid.
This meta-constraint employs the notion of informal validity, which 
requires further elaboration—especially in light of the fact that we 
do not assume that logical forms are already present in the informal 
argument pre-formalization.
Another formalization meta-constraint we may consider is the 
principle of univocality, by which the formalization function should 
take every two occurrences of the same expression in an argument in 
the source language to the same expression in the target language. We 
shall discuss this meta-constraint in the following subsection, along 
with the meta-constraint by which co-referring expressions in the 
source language should be formalized by the same expression in the 
target language. We tie these meta-constraints to Iacona’s constraints 
univocality and co-reference, as a basis for a comparison of our views.
3.3 Univocality, equivocation and co-reference
It is customary to assume that given an argument in a source language 
to be formalized, the context is constant throughout. This assump-
tion boils down to a brute force decontextualization of the source 
argument. Equivalently, one may assume the following formalization 
meta-constraint, which we shall refer to as the principle of univocality:
(PU) For any expression e in the source language and any contexts  
 c, c', F(ec)=F(e'c ).
Iacona formulates a univocality constraint (UC) along similar lines, 
which he claims is often taken for granted:
(UC) Any two occurrences of the same expression in an argument  
 must be interpreted in the same way (p. 94).
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Iacona does not endorse the univocality constraint in his definition of 
validity, as it is insensitive to context shifts that may occur mid-argu-
ment, deeming arguments such as (*) on p. 4 as valid inadvertently. 
Iacona’s definition of validity takes into account interpretations where 
context has shifted in the middle of the argument (although, notably, 
not in the middle of a sentence as is required by example (*)).
As it comes to formal languages used as target languages for for-
malization, we have assumed (UC) throughout, as it is one of the 
purposes of the formalization to decontextualize. Hence, in the out-
come of formalization, any two occurrences of the same expression 
will be interpreted in the same way (to be precise, what are inter-
preted are expression types and not occurrences, so the univocality 
constraint is ingrained in the framework).
The question arises as to whether there are necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for two occurrences of expressions (i.e. expressions 
in context) to be assigned the same target expression by the formal-
ization. Iacona focuses on names, and he contends that two occur-
rences of names should be formalized by the same target expression 
if and only if they denote the same object. Let us break down this 
claim. Iacona holds both following principles, phrased here in our 
terminology:
(I) If two occurrences of expressions in the source language de-
note distinct objects, they should be assigned different target ex-
pressions by the formalization function.
(II) If two occurrences of expressions in the source language de-
note the same object, they should be assigned the same target 
expression by the formalization function. (p. 71)
It would be helpful to distinguish two cases, one in which the two 
occurrences are of the same expression in the source language, and 
one in which we have two occurrences of different expressions in the 
source language. We shall review (I) and (II) in turn for both cases. 
Let us consider (I), when we have two occurrences of expres-
sions ec and e'c' such that e≠e'. Assume that ec and e'c' denote different 
objects. Obviously, the formalization function should give ec and e'c' 




Now, assume that we have two occurrences ec and ec' of the same 
expression e that denote different objects. Since the source language 
can be equivocal, and the target language cannot, we need to ac-
commodate the discrepancy by assigning to ec and ec' different target 
expressions. We do this by including the formalization constraint:
(13) F(ec)≠F(ec')
So far, we are in agreement with Iacona. Now, let us consider (II). 
Let ec and e'c' be two occurrences of distinct expressions e and e'. 
Assume that ec and e'c' denote the same object. Iacona would have us 
include the formalization constraint
(14) F(ec)=F(e'c')
This means, for instance, that “Hesperus is Phosphorus” will be for-
malized e.g. by “a=a” and will be determined to be a logical truth (as-
suming a few uncontentious formalization and semantic constraints). 
As a result, we have that a logical truth may be a posteriori, and fur-
ther, that adequate formalization may require non-trivial knowledge 
that goes beyond what may be expected of a competent speaker of a 
language. Iacona explains this odd result by distinguishing between 
logical knowledge and knowledge of logical form. One may be mas-
terful in logic, and be capable of saying for every form whether it is 
valid or not in a given system, but still be ignorant of the logical form 
of some natural language sentences (p. 80). Recall that for Iacona, 
logical form on its logical role is determined by truth conditions. 
It is not expected of a rational, competent speaker of a language to 
have ultimate knowledge of the truth conditions of every proposition 
expressed by sentences of the language. One can thus be mistaken of 
the adequate formalization of a sentence, and thus of its logical form.
The approach to formalization that I put forward does not agree 
with Iacona’s results. Indeed, here is where the difference in stances 
towards formalization and the notion of logical form has its most 
straightforward implications. Formalization, on the present ap-
proach, is not a descriptive procedure that reveals a pre-existing log-
ical form. Formalization is an interpretive endeavor, highly underde-
termined, which is governed by commitments of the interpreter (or 
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the reasoner). Whatever constrains the formalization of a specific 
locution must be expressed as a commitment on behalf of the in-
terpreter. Principles restricting the admissible constraints are ex-
pressed as meta-commitments. Thus, the formalization function 
will be forced to assign the same target expression to ec and e'c' only if 
the interpreter carrying out the formalization is ready to commit to 
the formalization constraint F(ec)=F(e'c'), and presumably they would 
do so only on the basis of the presumption that ec and e'c' co-refer. 
Logical form, on this conception, is always accessible to the reasoner 
carrying out the formalization—indeed, it is imposed by the for-
malization. Surely, there are criteria for adequate formalization, as 
mentioned in §2. The formalization assigned by a reasoner might be 
inadequate in some respects—but that will not be due to its failure 
to capture a pre-existing logical form unknown to the reasoner.
It may be noted that the framework of semantic constraints can 
manage co-reference through a semantic constraint on the target lan-
guage. Assume that F(ec)=ê and that F(e'c')=ê'. 
To account for the co-reference of ec and e'c', one may include the 
semantic constraint
(15) I(ê)=I(ê')
having the same effect on validity as including the aforementioned 
formalization constraint. Standard logical systems deny this course 
of action, and they account for co-reference only through the use of 
the same expression. The framework as has been set up does not give 
preference to either the semantic or the formalization constraint, and 
we leave aside the question whether additional considerations can de-
cide the matter. What is pertinent to the present issue is that either 
the formalization or the semantic constraint must be committed to 
by the theorizer in order to have an effect on logical properties. I 
suggest that while it is permissible to commit to such constraints, 
there shouldn’t be a general rule imposing such commitments, and 
so the meta-constraint (II) should be rejected.
We may still consider the case where two occurrences of the 
same expression denote the same object. Should these two occur-
rences be formalized as the same target expression? For example, 
when formalizing “Hesperus is Hesperus”, shouldn’t we restrict our-
selves to formalization functions that agree on their assignment to 
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the two occurrences of “Hesperus”, assuming that they co-refer in 
their respective contexts? Any reasonable formalization, it may be 
contended, will be thus restricted, and so a=a is an adequate formal-
ization for this sentence while a=b is not. That may be so, but again, 
on the present approach, forcing the formalization function to give 
the same target expression to the two occurrences of “Hesperus” 
needs to be done through committing to a formalization constraint. 
Here, as well, a meta-constraint forcing co-referring occurrences of 
the same expression to be assigned the same target expression should 
be rejected, as there may be cases of univocality where the theorizer 
would not make the appropriate commitment due to ignorance of 
co-reference or for any other reason.
The situation we have is as follows. We start with occurrences 
of expressions in context, on which we impose some patterns us-
ing formalization constraints. That two occurrences are or are not 
of the same expression-type may guide us in forming formalization 
constraints, but the acceptance of such constraints is ad hoc and de-
pends on the specific commitments of the theorizer on the occasion 
of interpretation.
Iacona cites Russell and Wittgenstein as holding that in a logically 
ideal language, sameness of sign signifies sameness of reference and 
difference in sign signifies difference in reference. But here we refer 
back to Carnap’s amendment: in a logically perfect language co-ref-
erence might be discerned from the symbols alone—provided only 
that appropriate rules (here: formalization and semantic constraints) 
have been given.
4 Conclusion
The present study began with Iacona’s denial of the uniqueness thesis, by 
which there is a unique notion of logical form that fulfils both the log-
ical and the semantic roles. I am in agreement with Iacona that there 
are different notions of logical form that serve the different roles. I 
have focused on the logical role and its connection with formalization. 
I proposed an alternative characterization of the logical role of logical 
form, by which the assignment of a logical form to a natural language 
sentence through formalization is not merely descriptive. Formaliza-
tion is part of the interpretation and analysis of a text by a reasoner, 
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interpreter or interlocutor, which ultimately serves for the evalua-
tion of the arguments presented in the text. On this approach, logical 
form is not there to be discovered, but it is determined through the 
interpretive process. There may be criteria for the adequacy of a for-
malization, but the outcome is always underdetermined. The explicit 
statement of the rules of a formal language and of the formalization 
into it is then the source of the normative force of the interpretive 
process. Thus, in distinction to Iacona’s approach, logical form is al-
ways accessible to the reasoner conducting the formalization.
On the present approach, formalization entails the explicit state-
ment of rules and thereby of commitments on behalf of the one for-
malizing to the logical norms that may be associated with these rules. 
The framework of semantic constraints provides a formal backdrop 
for these commitments to be spelled out. We have seen how vari-
ous principles regarding formalization can be expressed by semantic 
or formalization constraints or meta-constraints in this framework. 
In particular, we have seen that the treatment of equivocation and 
co-reference marks a difference between the present approach and 
Iacona’s: while for Iacona, logical form in the cases of equivocation 
and co-reference might be obscure to the reasoner, on the present 
approach whatever is part of the logical form must be accessible 
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